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The past, Brexit, and the future in Northern Ireland: a quasi-experiment

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ABSTRACT


The UK's decision to leave the European Union has raised questions about whether Brexit might bring "the Troubles" back to Northern Ireland. We exploit the timing of a unique survey to examine how the EU referendum campaign and its outcome shaped perceptions about the past conflict and preferences for the future in Northern Ireland. The survey reveals that, after the Leave vote, people were more likely to perceive the partitioning of the Island of Ireland and illegitimate rule of Westminster as important conflict causes. Respondents surveyed after the referendum were also more likely to see reunification with Ireland as desirable, and changes in conflict perceptions contributed to this change in preferences for the future. At the same time, public responses seem to be the result of a gradual change during the *campaign* rather than a shock effect to the *outcome*, and effects decay quickly. These findings contribute to a better understanding of the micro-foundations driving post-Brexit public opinion in Northern Ireland and the potential consequences of holding contentious referendums more generally.

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Introduction

On 23 June 2016, the United Kingdom (UK) held a referendum on whether to leave the European Union (EU).¹ The majority in Scotland and Northern Ireland voted to remain but were outnumbered by the Leave vote in England and Wales (Soares 2016). The referendum and its somewhat surprising outcome led to heated debates across the country and particularly in Northern

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¹We use the terms "referendum", "EU referendum", and "Brexit referendum" interchangeably to refer to the *United Kingdom European Union membership referendum*.

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Ireland. Many feared a potential “hard” border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland could bring back “the Troubles” (Murphy 2021). “The Troubles” was a territorial and sectarian conflict over the constitutional status of Northern Ireland, fuelled by socio-economic inequalities and the state’s use of repression (McGovern 2015). Backed by the British Army, the Protestant community (“unionists”) wanted to remain part of the UK, while the Catholic community (“nationalists”) sought Irish reunification. The 30-year conflict ended officially with the Good Friday Agreement in 1998² – and while the agreement has been a success in the sense that there has been no conflict resurgence, paramilitary groups are still controlling certain locales in Northern Ireland (Rickard and Bakke 2021). The EU played an important role throughout the peace process and beyond (Tonge 2016). For example, a key provision in the agreement related to cross-border cooperation on the island, which was based on the shared UK and Irish membership of the EU (Phinnemore et al. 2012; Trumbore and Owsiak 2019). It is therefore not surprising that people wondered whether leaving the EU would jeopardize political stability and the peace process in Northern Ireland.

Such concerns were not entirely unfounded. While the Brexit negotiations avoided a hard border on the island, once Brexit officially came into effect (on 31 December 2020), the resulting border in the Irish Sea fuelled tensions and even riots in Northern Ireland (McKay 2017, 2018). In this Research Note, we examine how Brexit affected people’s views on “the Troubles” and their preferences for Northern Ireland’s future constitutional status. Theoretically, we draw on notions of *priming*, *uncertainty*, and *neglect* to explain and discern campaign and outcome effects. Empirically, we leverage unique survey data collected in Northern Ireland in the run-up to and immediate aftermath of the Brexit referendum. The referendum has encouraged a growing body of research on the conduct and consequences of referendums (Renwick, Palese, and Sargeant 2020; Schwartz et al. 2020). Our study contributes to this nascent literature, illustrating how this contentious referendum increased the salience of a conflict that officially ended more than 20 years ago.

Brexit and Northern Ireland: priming, uncertainty, and neglect

We argue that the concepts of *priming*, *uncertainty*, and *neglect* help explain how both the campaign and outcome may have affected public opinion in Northern Ireland. First, political campaigns, such as the one leading up to the Brexit referendum, often change people’s information environment which, in turn, draws their attention to and increases the salience of certain

²The agreement has two parts, the *Multi-Party Agreement* signed by the major political parties in Northern Ireland, and the *British-Irish Agreement* between the governments of the UK and Republic of Ireland.

issues – a phenomenon known as *priming* (Vössing and Weber 2019). We see priming as the first prerequisite for the EU referendum to have an impact on people's conflict perceptions. By bringing up "the Troubles" again, the campaign might have activated people's memories of the past in general or incentivised a resurgence of specific conflict narratives, such as the border on the island of Ireland (McKay 2017, 2018; Trumbore and Owsiak 2019). Second, because priming occurred throughout the entire Brexit campaign, we posit that *uncertainty* and *neglect* are concurrent mechanisms to understand post-Brexit public opinion in Northern Ireland. When people woke up in the morning of 24 June 2016, the prospect of leaving the EU – which potentially included a hard border on the island or, alternatively, a border in the Irish Sea – was no longer hypothetical. Although about 45% of the population in Northern Ireland voted for Brexit, the decision to leave the EU and the associated border issue raised concerns about whether Brexit could jeopardize the Northern Ireland economy and peace process (McKay 2017, 2018; Wright 2016). Moreover, while the potential impact of Brexit on the peace process was a concern for the Northern Irish, these concerns barely resonated in the rest of the UK (Burke 2016; see also Appendix D.4). This may have spurred a sense of neglect across Northern Ireland once this scenario became a reality.

Thus, taken together, both the Brexit campaign and the referendum outcome may have prompted the Northern Irish to reminisce about the dark days of "the Troubles", to worry about political and economic instability, and to feel neglected by Westminster. All of this, we argue, may have shaped their attitudes towards the key cleavages of the conflict and their preferences for Northern Ireland's political future.

Materials and methods

The Brexit referendum took place during the collection of the Post-conflict Attitudes for Peace (PAP; Dyrstad, Bakke, and Binningsbø 2021) survey. PAP is a face-to-face nationally representative survey conducted between 10 May and 16 July 2016, with the EU referendum taking place on 23 June (see Appendix A.1).³ To measure people's views on the conflict's causes, we asked the following question:

People have different views on what caused "the Troubles". I will now read a few statements about possible causes, or reasons, for the conflict, and I would like you to tell me how important you think each of them was.

³The fieldwork was planned to include the day of the referendum, given that we had prior beliefs the referendum could influence political worldviews. However, given the unprecedented nature of the referendum and resulting lack of research on its potential impact, we had no clear expectation of which worldviews would be affected or to what extent.

Table 1. Outcome variables and summary statistics.

Variable	<i>N</i>	Mean	SD	Min	Max
A. Importance of conflict causes					
Economic inequalities and poverty	733	3.859	1.134	1	5
Community or religious inequalities	742	4.159	0.940	1	5
Government repression and discrimination	727	3.781	1.112	1	5
Lack of real democracy in NI	716	3.747	1.146	1	5
Extremist Republicans ^a	739	4.026	1.107	1	5
Extremist loyalists	737	3.845	1.199	1	5
Illegitimate rule from Westminster	691	3.237	1.296	1	5
The partition of Ireland	710	3.675	1.192	1	5
B. Preferences for the future ^b					
Remain part of the UK	813	0.627	0.484	0	1
Become an independent state	813	0.069	0.253	0	1
Unify with the rest of Ireland	813	0.169	0.375	0	1

Notes: ^aThe term “republicans” refer to paramilitary groups associated with the nationalist side in the struggle; “loyalists” refer to paramilitary groups associated with the unionist side. ^bHere, we followed the Northern Irish Life and Times survey (2016) and listed all theoretically interesting and politically relevant options. However, if the Northern Irish are ever presented with a referendum on their constitutional future, there will be only two options: remain part of the UK or unify with Ireland (Northern Ireland Act 1998). In Appendix D.5, we discuss possible effects of this choice on the response distribution.

The statements contain political, economic, actor-based, and constitutional causes of the conflict. To measure people’s preferences for the political future of Northern Ireland, we asked the following question: “If the UK leaves the EU, do you think Northern Ireland should (1) Remain part of the UK, (2) Become an independent state, or (3) Unify with the rest of Ireland”. All outcome variables are summarized in Table 1.

To explore the impact of the Brexit campaign and its outcome on these variables, we apply a two-fold analytical strategy. First, we use the day of the referendum to split the sample into a control group interviewed before the vote and a treatment group interviewed after the result of the referendum was known,⁴ and obtain a baseline estimation of the compound effect of the Brexit campaign and knowing the outcome of the referendum by fitting the following linear model:

$$y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Brexit dummy} + \varepsilon_i$$

with β_1 being the estimate of interest (i.e. the average treatment effect, ATE). We believe all assumptions are met to exploit the EU referendum as a natural experiment with one important exception, discussed in the next paragraph. First, balance tests confirm that there are only a few observable differences between individuals interviewed before and after the referendum (Appendix B.1). To deal with imbalances, we (1) include the unbalanced

⁴The effective sample size used varies slightly for each model, with N_{before} [507;593] and N_{after} [184;220], depending on the number of valid observations per outcome variable. Results are robust to applying listwise deletion (Appendix D.1). Respondents interviewed on the referendum day are included in the control group. Again, results are robust to excluding these (Appendix D.2).

covariates as controls and (2) use them to pre-process the data with entropy matching to improve covariate balance between the treatment and control groups (Hainmueller 2012). Second, respondents could not self-select into the treatment or control condition based on prior knowledge of the outcome of the referendum for two reasons: Respondents could have guessed but not known the outcome in advance, given the close polls in the lead-up to the referendum (Appendix B.2), and interview dates were set beforehand by the researchers irrespective of the referendum or respondents' characteristics. Finally, we consider the probability of non-compliance in the treatment group to be low given the high salience of the referendum (Moore and Ramsay 2017), differences in attrition between the control and treatment groups are statistically insignificant (Appendix B.3), and the results reported below pass a placebo outcome test (Appendix B.4).

However, one identification assumption underlying natural experiments is not met in our design: the temporal stability assumption. That is, we expect pre-existing time trends – more specifically, campaign trends – that, aside from the referendum outcome itself, are systematically related to our outcomes of interest. While such time trends might violate the excludability assumption underlying natural experiments (see Muñoz, Falcó-Gimeno, and Hernández 2020), they are of special interest in this study. Trying to distinguish campaign trends from outcome effects, we graphically inspect trends in public opinion in the weeks before and after the EU referendum and formally test the presence of time trends and a Brexit shock effect by expanding Equation (1) as follows:

$$y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Brexit dummy} + \beta_2 \text{Days} + \beta_3 (\text{Brexit dummy} * \text{Days}) + \varepsilon,$$

with β_1 being the effect of Brexit when the variable “Days” equals 0 (i.e. the day after the referendum; 24 June), β_2 the underlying campaign trend, and β_3 the change in the Brexit effect over time. This amounts to a regression discontinuity design where “Days” is the so-called “running variable” and we have set the cut-off point (where the running variable equals 0) to 24 June, the first day after the referendum vote.

Results

As a preliminary step, we examine the descriptive statistics in Table 1. Our respondents rate all conflict causes as important, with “economic inequalities and poverty” seen as the most important and “illegitimate rule from Westminster” as the least important cause.⁵ Moreover, while two-thirds of those surveyed want to remain part of the UK, 17% favour a united Ireland. In the

⁵The former also has the smallest standard deviation and the latter the largest. Additionally, we have more missing values for the latter (15% versus roughly 10% for all other items), indicating that this question might suffer more social desirability bias.




Figure 1. Average treatment effect of the referendum on perceptions of conflict causes.

next section, we first estimate the *compound* effect of the Brexit campaign and outcome on these conflict perceptions and future preferences. Then, we try to tease out campaign and outcome effects by inspecting pre- and post-referendum trends. Finally, we examine the extent to which changes in conflict perceptions help explain shifts in future preferences. Given the exploratory nature of our design, we focus primarily on the effect sizes and their corresponding uncertainty (Greenland et al. 2016).

Baseline estimation of EU referendum effects

First, we assess whether and how the Brexit campaign and referendum shaped people's perceptions about the causes of "the Troubles". If Brexit activated people's memory of the past, we would expect the conflict and its root causes to be more prominent after 23 June. However, given the salience of the border issue and the possibility of a hard border due to the Leave vote, it is also plausible that *only* the island issue became more accessible in people's minds. Figure 1 presents the difference in means between pre- and post-referendum respondents for the importance attached to specific conflict causes (see Appendix C for numerical results). For almost all outcomes and model specifications, the confidence intervals include a possible effect of zero and the point estimates range from $b = -0.00$ to $b = 0.10$ (on a 5-point scale).⁶ There are two exceptions, however. Respondents

⁶Hence, as evidenced by the range of the confidence intervals, an effect of zero (i.e. H_0) is not the only hypothesis compatible with the data.

interviewed after the referendum are more likely to indicate that “illegitimate rule from Westminster” ($ATE_{\text{matched}} = 0.22, p = .042, 95\% \text{ CI } [0.01, 0.43]$) and “the partition of Ireland” ($ATE_{\text{matched}} = 0.23, p = .016, 95\% \text{ CI } [0.04, 0.42]$) underpinned “the Troubles”. Taken together, we find evidence for issue priming rather than for a more general activation of conflict narratives, although we note the uncertainty around the effects.

In addition to affecting views on the causes of the past conflict, the referendum also seems to have changed people’s preferences for Northern Ireland’s political future. Specifically, the share of respondents who prefer reunification increased by about nine percentage points when it became clear that the UK would leave the EU, while the share of respondents who wanted to stay in the UK fell by about 13 percentage points (Figure 2). Figure 3 confirms that these changes are not only substantial but also significant, regardless of model specification, and that the uncertainty around the estimates is small.

Campaign versus outcome effects

We posit that the above results are based on a *priming* effect that occurred throughout the Brexit campaign as well as concurrent *uncertainty* and *neglect* effects that arose because of the referendum outcome. Trying to differentiate the *priming* from the *uncertainty* and *neglect* effect, we plot and formally test changes in perceptions before and after the referendum (see Figure 4 for conflict causes, Figure 5 for future preferences, and Appendix C for all estimates). Figure 4 presents a more nuanced view of changes in conflict perceptions during the campaign, with a small increase in the importance attached to all socio-economic and political causes and a somewhat sharper decrease in the blame attributed to “Extremist




Figure 2. Pre- and post-referendum preferences for the future of Northern Ireland (%).




Figure 3. Average treatment effect of the referendum on preferences for the future.

Republicans” and “Extremist Loyalists”. Similarly, [Figure 5](#) shows how people’s preferences for the political future of Northern Ireland gradually changed throughout the campaign. Finally, we can visually note how most attitudes return relatively quickly to the values measured at the beginning of the fieldwork. In short, the regression discontinuity results underscore the importance of priming effect of the Brexit *campaign*, and such priming effects were sometimes glossed over in previous models. At the same time, the results also suggest that reactions to the Brexit campaign and referendum are limited in size and duration.

How perceptions about the past influences preferences for the future

Finally, we examine the extent to which Brexit-induced changes in perceptions about the conflict shaped preferences for the constitutional future of Northern Ireland, by estimating the average causal mediation effect (ACME; Imai, Keele, and Tingley 2010).⁷ The results confirm that Brexit had both a direct and indirect effect, via the activation of conflict narratives, on

⁷The AMCE estimates include covariates to correct for imbalances and enter the mediators separately as they are correlated to a significant extent ($r = .47, p < .001$). Additional information on the causal mediation analysis is provided in [Appendix D.3](#). Here, we also complement the causal chain by




Figure 4. Change in perceptions of conflict causes over time.

people’s preferences for the future (all AMCE’s = ±0.02, $p < .05$). These mediation effects are not negligible, as they explain about 20% of the “Brexit effect” on people’s preferences for the future (see [Appendix C.5](#) for

assessing how conflict narratives (the mediators) inform people’s preferences for the future of Northern Ireland (the outcome).




Figure 5. Change in preferences for the future over time.

all estimates). In short, the referendum, and especially its campaign, reinforced the desire for reunification at the expense of remaining in the UK by, among other things, fuelling a revival of particular conflict narratives.

Discussion

Since the prospect of a renewed border on the island of Ireland became a reality, policymakers, media pundits, and scientists alike have voiced concern as to whether Brexit could endanger the peace process in Northern Ireland. In this Research Note, we leveraged a natural experiment to examine how Brexit affected Northern Irish perceptions of the past conflict and preferences for the future. The scope of our study was modest, taking an exploratory approach with a sample size of 700–800 individuals. While we do not want to overstate the conclusiveness of our findings, our empirical analyses suggest that certain conflict narratives resurged in the aftermath of the EU referendum. More specifically, in post-referendum Northern Ireland, people gave more weight to the constitutional questions that were at the heart of “the Troubles”, such as the “illegitimate rule from Westminster” and “partition of Ireland”. These changes partially channel the effect of the referendum on individuals’ preferences for the future of Northern Ireland. At the same time, the campaign gradually increased the salience of most other conflict narratives as well, but this increase quickly receded. In sum, although factors such as economic insecurity and border checks are also at play (Garry et al. 2018), our study suggests that an increased salience of particular conflict narratives can explain part of the post-referendum rise in the desire to leave the UK and join Ireland instead.

These changes in public opinion may entail important consequences for the future of Northern Ireland given that the Northern Ireland Act (1998) stipulates that the UK Secretary of State “shall” hold a poll on the constitutional

status of Northern Ireland if “it appears likely [...] that a majority of those voting would express a wish that Northern Ireland should cease to be part of the United Kingdom and form part of a united Ireland” (119).⁸ Even though the regression discontinuity results suggest the effects decay, we believe that the documented changes in public opinion nevertheless might have persisted (or reoccurred) after 23 June. Recent studies demonstrate how post-Brexit changes in public opinion do not indicate a short-lived backlash but hold or increase even one year after the referendum (Schwartz et al. 2020; van der Eijk and Rose 2021). One possible explanation for the persistence of those effects might be repeated exposure to certain media narratives. In this regard, it is important to note that the border issue has received much attention after the referendum and after Brexit came into effect (e.g. Fleming 2021; McKay 2018). Our finding that priming certain conflict narratives partially determines future preferences, may help explain why recent polls document a further increase in the desire for reunification (Garry et al. 2018; McGovern 2020). Yet, this hypothesis calls for further scrutiny. Another hypothesis concerns conditional treatment effects. The Brexit vote was strongly linked to the underlying ethnoreligious divide in Northern Ireland with 85% of Catholics (who tend to favour a united Ireland) voting to Remain (Garry 2016). Catholics were thus among the biggest “losers” of the referendum. Based on the literature on losers’ consent (van der Eijk and Rose 2021), we can expect to see a stronger opinion change among Catholics (and other Remain voters) as a counter-reaction, especially regarding a united Ireland. Yet, our sample was too small to conduct subgroup analyses.

Finally, our work has timely implications beyond the case in question. Regionalist and secessionist movements seem to be on the rise, and cases like Catalonia and the Basque country show that regional identities may prove salient and highly emotive for large segments of the electorate in other established democracies (e.g. Brigevidch 2018). When certain issues and identities become heavily mediatized and politicized (as was the case with the EU referendum), referendum campaigns might aggravate rather than solve problems, particularly in divided societies. Indeed, this study suggests that contentious referendum campaigns – and perhaps election campaigns more generally – can increase the salience of latent conflicts, thereby having considerable effects on public opinion.

Data availability

The data that support the findings of this study will be made openly available within the Harvard Dataverse network.

⁸The Secretary of State may also order a poll, at any time, provided no similar poll was held in the last seven years.

Disclosure statement

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